King William's War Page 9
To carry through with this task the king gave Denonville five hundred troops of the Free Companies of the Marine, but unlike in the past where the designated companies had been simply transferred from their stations in the various ports in France, the marquis was free to recruit what was essentially a battalion of colonial marines. It is something of a testimony to Denonville’s reputation that he had no problems raising the troops in question. In fact, many of the senior noncommissioned officers were regular officers who had been placed on half-pay with the army reductions that followed the Dutch war. While the troops were being recruited and marshaled at La Rochelle, the new governor used the time to become thoroughly acquainted with the affairs of New France. What he found depressed and confused him, but he convinced himself that these matters would be clearer once he arrived in Quebec.
With the logistics addressed the marquis set sail for Canada, dropping anchor at Quebec on August 1, 1685. After a brief tour and meetings with the colony’s senior officials, he was convinced that matters were in fact far worse than he had imagined. The lure of the fur trade had stripped the colony of precious resources and returned little in the way of permanent measures toward securing it. Added to this, the expansion brought on by this trade had stretched colonial military resources, making the defense and security of these remote posts nearly impossible. Nor were the current fortifications within the heart of the colony adequate. The only post worth mentioning was Quebec, but even here the fortifications had been neglected. At Three Rivers the wooden palisade that surrounded the town was in disrepair and without gates. Between Three Rivers and Montreal Denonville found “not a solitary spot affording the semblance of shelter from an enemy,” while Montreal was just as bad, “there being nothing to stop a determined enemy from raiding and burning the town.”3
There were numerous other problems to contend with as well, ranging from the ill conduct of the populace associated with the fur trade to matters of establishing industries, such as iron foundries. All of these, however, paled in comparison to those concerning foreign threats to the colony. First among these were the Iroquois. Of all the native nations “they are the most powerful by reason of the facility they possess of procuring arms from the English,” the marquis informed the French court. “Their large purchases of arms and ammunition from the English, at a low rate, have given them hitherto all the advantage they possess over other tribes.” At the moment the question was not whether the Iroquois would attack New France; this seemed unlikely. Instead the Iroquois appeared content to take advantage of the terms of La Barre’s peace treaty by concentrating on breaking the Franco-native trade alliance. Once this was done and they had diverted the fur trade to Albany, they could then turn their efforts toward the colony. Backed by English guns and money, New France would face dire days without a major intervention on the part of the king. In Denonville’s opinion the only way to prevent this catastrophe was to strike against the Iroquois in order to secure the trade alliance.
While the Iroquois were a direct threat, the English concerned the French governor just as much. “It is well to consider whether the English are not equally, if not more to be feared,” he wrote the minister of the marine, “and whether we must not take as much care to protect ourselves against them.” To the south, New York supplied New France’s native enemies and fueled their ambitions while New England tested the colony’s resolve by pressing English claims in Acadia. To the far north another English threat was gathering at James Bay. The establishment of several English trading posts in this disputed area, Denonville pointed out, “will be more injurious to us than in the direction of Acadia: For if their establishments continue as they have begun at the three places on that Bay which they actually occupy, and on the river Bourbon or Port Nelson, we must expect to see all the best of the Beaver Trade, both as to quality and quantity, in the hands of the English.”4
With external threats posed on all sides it was in the northern direction that the marquis first took action. Over the course of the winter Denonville planned an expedition against the English posts on James Bay. To command this effort the governor turned to a marine captain, Pierre de Troyes, who had sailed to Quebec with the marquis. Denonville ordered Troyes to take a small force, march north, and occupy posts on the shores of the bay. For diplomatic reasons, no mention was ever made of the English or of seizing the existing English posts along the bay. Instead the orders focused on arresting illegal traders and those associated with them “wherever they may be found.” If in Troyes’s opinion this required seizing a fort to accomplish his task, so much the better as far as the governor was concerned.5
Troyes’s expedition, which was poorly cloaked in the guise of a law enforcement matter, was hardly the first military act along James Bay. In fact, the short history behind the establishment of European trading posts in this area was filled with treachery and conflict. After the initial voyage of discovery by the ill-fated Henry Hudson, a number of English vessels visited this area between 1612 and 1632. As such, the English were quick to claim sovereignty over the region. The French countered that all of these voyages had been conducted in search of the elusive Northwest Passage, with Hudson and James Bays being nothing more than waypoints for these expeditions. If not, then why had no posts or permanent settlements been erected to support these territorial claims? Nothing was resolved, and for four decades questions regarding claims to this vast uncharted area received little attention and even less debate.
In 1668 this changed, primarily due to the efforts of two French adventurers, Medard Chouart des Groseilliers and Pierre-Esprit Radisson. In 1659 the two men were among some of the first coureurs de bois to travel to the shores of Lake Superior. The pair traded with the Petun and wintered with the Sioux in upper Minnesota, returning to Montreal the following year with three hundred canoes filled with furs and news of trading opportunities to the west. Groseilliers followed this lucrative venture with another expedition the following year. It was during this time that he first heard news of Hudson Bay and the prosperous beaver opportunities that existed among the tribes in the area. After another expedition, which proved so profitable that it put him at odds with the traditional fur-trading establishment, measures to limit the coureurs de bois and other private traders were put into effect by the colonial government. The ultimate aim, of course, was to promote the practice of having the tribes bring their furs to Montreal, thus keeping the manpower of the colony at work improving the settlement. Groseilliers was fined and had a portion of his furs confiscated. The trader argued against such a policy but to no avail. He then turned to his brother-in-law Radisson for advice and it is likely that Radisson, after hearing of Hudson Bay, convinced Groseilliers to seek money in France to finance an expedition.
At this point Groseilliers modified his plan. He had initially intended to reach Hudson Bay by way of the interior waterways leading north from Lake Superior, but either through Radisson’s knowledge of geography or reports from previous English expeditions, the original plan was put aside and replaced with a seaborne trek. Groseilliers traveled to France and secured support from a La Rochelle merchant, but the venture soon dissolved. Undaunted, he next turned to English support and soon found himself in Boston. Here he found enthusiasm for the venture but a questionable level of commitment, resulting in several aborted attempts. At this point Radisson and Groseilliers met a visiting royal commission consisting of New York governor Richard Nicolls and several of his senior officers fresh from their conquest of New Netherland. One of Nicolls’s staff, Colonel George Cartwright, the same officer who had accepted the surrender of Fort Orange, advised the pair to sail to England and present their plan to King Charles II.6
The adventurers took the colonel’s advice and set sail for England. Armed with a letter from Cartwright, Groseilliers was fortunate enough to be introduced to Prince Rupert of the Rhine. Rupert had served as the commander of King Charles I’s army during the English Civil War. With the restoration of the Stuarts, Rupert, who wa
s cousin to Charles II, was given a naval command, which he competently exercised during a number of engagements during the Second Anglo-Dutch War. The prince also managed a number of successful business ventures during this time, including a leading position within the Royal African Company and a seat on the Board of Trade. The prince pledged to finance the expedition and organized a company of which James, the Duke of York, Charles II, and Rupert were prominent investors. After an abortive attempt in 1667, the following year Radisson and Groseilliers set sail for Hudson Bay aboard a pair of small vessels, the Eaglet and Nonsuch. The former, with Radisson on board, reached the Hudson Straits but could not safely force passage into Hudson Bay and turned back. The Nonsuch, with Groseilliers on board, successfully navigated the hazardous narrows and made landfall at the mouth of what is now known as the Rupert River at the southern end of James Bay. Groseilliers built a small trading post on the site and later that fall sent the Nonsuch back to England loaded with furs. The next year Radisson arrived onboard the Eaglet with news that the Nonsuch had delivered her cargo and that the investors were so happy that they had purchased a third ship to help carry on the trade at the post.
Radisson was not boasting of the enthusiasm shown by Rupert and his investors. A charter was quickly drawn up asking Charles II for a patent granting a trade monopoly in Hudson Bay. Charles granted the patent in May 1670, which gave the Company of Merchant Adventurers trading into Hudson Bay, exclusive commercial rights in the area, police powers, administrative power, and the power to make war and peace with any native tribe in the region. As for the region itself, it was simply described as all lands whose waters emptied into Hudson Bay.7
When news reached Quebec of the English trading post on Hudson Bay it did not take long for the French to object. They disputed English claims and asserted their own, which in general were weaker. In 1671, the intendant of New France, Jean Talon, sent Jesuit father Albanel toward James Bay with orders to ascertain the English position on the waters, to determine the prospects and possible location for a French trading post, and to convince the natives in the area to trade with the French. Reports of this French probe spurred Hudson Bay governor Charles Bailey to build a second trading post at the mouth of the Moose River in 1673. The new location was better suited for security reasons and, it was hoped, would stymie French trading efforts. The company’s main operations were shifted from Fort Charles, or Rupert’s House as it became known, over to this location not long after news reached Bailey that the French had erected a trading post farther up the Moose River.
Even with the threat of a rival French commercial presence lurking on the horizon the next few years found the profitable Hudson Bay Company expanding its operations. Supply vessels began regularly arriving, unloading their trade goods before filling their holds with beaver destined for England. Rupert’s House was expanded. A rendezvous site was erected on Charlton Island to coordinate shipping and receiving with the two trading posts on James Bay, or factories as the English referred to them. The cartographers were busy as well, making navigational maps and attempting to chart the extent of the company’s grant. Another post was added as well. Governor Bailey erected Fort Albany in 1674 on the north bank of the Albany River near its outlet into James Bay. Its purpose followed the governor’s thinking that posts should be built at the mouth of all the rivers emptying into James Bay. This would entice more trade by providing better opportunities for the region’s tribes to bring their furs to market.8
By 1679 neither Groseilliers nor Radisson was in the employment of the Hudson Bay Company. The English expansion had begun to alarm New France. The Compagnie du Nord, the French equivalent of the Hudson Bay Company, desperately needed to establish their claims and challenge the English traders in the disputed region. The question was, who would lead this effort? The governor of New France, Louis de Buade, the Count Frontenac, believed he had an answer. In the fall of 1673 he dispatched Father Albanel to James Bay to dissuade the tribes of that area from trading with the English and to “sound out Des Groseilliers, if he meets him, and to try to find out whether he can bring him back to our side.”9
After a series of setbacks, Albanel, bearing a letter from Frontenac to Governor Bailey, reached Rupert’s House on August 30, 1674. Bailey correctly assessed Albanel’s real mission to incite dissent among the local tribes against the English and had him arrested and sent to England. In England Albanel met with Groseilliers and Radisson. He found a receptive audience in the two men, and both returned to French allegiance in 1675. Groseilliers returned to Three Rivers the following year while Radisson offered his services to the French navy.
In 1679, after having lost his possessions in a shipwreck, Radisson began seeking support to establish a French trading post along the shores of Hudson Bay. Although there was interest, his questionable credibility made support difficult to come by in the French court. Fortunately for Radisson, Charles la Chesnaye, the head of the Compagnie du Nord threw his support behind the adventurer’s plan, which convinced the minister of the marine to listen. In the end the crown supported the idea but not to the point that they were willing to finance the venture. Needing financial backing, Radisson turned to the Jesuits, who agreed to finance the operation, as it offered new opportunities to spread the gospel to the tribes of the region.
With Jesuit backing Groseilliers and Radisson reunited in Canada to lay out the logistics of the expedition. The government of New France did not officially sanction the plan, although it was clear that they supported the goal of disrupting English trade in the region and undermining any territorial claims that might be argued at a later date. Instead, the expedition was under the banner of the Compagnie du Nord. This did little to change the objectives. It was agreed that a new post would be erected, and if opportunity presented itself, the English posts were to be seized under the argument that they were on land belonging to King Louis.
Setting out in two small and well-used vessels, the St. Pierre and the St. Anne, Radisson and Groseilliers’s force numbered some thirty traders and sailors. After a rough voyage both vessels rendezvoused in Hudson Bay, near the mouth of what would be called the Nelson River on August 27, 1682. After selecting a site on the Hayes River the two crews set to work constructing a fort while scouting parties were sent upriver. To the surprise of both Radisson and Groseilliers they stumbled upon a New England-sponsored trading post, which had arrived two weeks earlier.
Radisson, who knew several members of the New England delegation, warned them off by telling them they were on French-claimed land. Not long after, he had a bigger problem. An English vessel had entered the Nelson River carrying the new governor of the Hudson Bay Company, John Bridgar. A standoff of sorts occurred, with Radisson claiming that this was French land and that significant French reinforcements were arriving soon. Bridgar was not convinced, and once the French party moved off, he began constructing Fort Nelson, the fourth Hudson Bay Company post.10
Over the course of the winter Groseilliers and Radisson worked on completing Fort Bourbon, while the New Englanders under Benjamin Gillam spent the time erecting a fine fort mounting six cannon. Governor Bridgar had been busy as well, spending his time on overseeing the construction of Fort Nelson. The proximity of the three competitive parties and their aspirations to control trade in the region almost guaranteed that the peace would not last long. Radisson and Groseilliers, fearing the commercial implications with the coming of spring, seized the New England post. When news reached Governor Bridgar at Fort Nelson, he was at first surprised to hear that a New England party had encamped nearby. Although the New Englanders were likely interlopers on Hudson Bay Company territory he sent a relief party, in part to capture the New Englander’s brig Susan, as Bridgar’s ship, the Prince Rupert, had not survived the winter ice. The venture backfired as Radisson, expecting such a move, laid a trap and captured almost the entire English party. After reinforcements arrived from Groseilliers, Radisson felt strong enough to go after Fort Nelson. Using the attempt to
seize the Susan as an excuse, Radisson marched on Fort Nelson and by nightfall was master of the wooden palisade.
By fall the two adventurers had agreed to return to Quebec, carrying their English prisoners with them. After a harrowing journey through a tempest of North Atlantic sailing weather, they arrived in Quebec and presented themselves to Governor La Barre. La Barre released the English along with the Susan after a stern warning that they had encroached on French lands.11
The news of the duo’s conquest of the English trading posts soon reached Europe and the colonies. In the diplomatic arena, La Barre had just received orders from the king to exert himself in preventing the English from establishing a presence on Hudson Bay, and although the actions on the part of Groseilliers and Radisson might cause some stir, it would go far in keeping the fur trade in French hands. On the business front, it was another matter. The Hudson Bay Company had no intentions of backing away from their claims, nor were they interested in allowing the Compagnie du Nord to infringe upon their trade. There was simply too much money at stake.