King William's War Read online

  This left only a military solution, which La Barre had favored from the outset. The governor’s councilors agreed, but such an approach was fraught with questions and perils. The first question was where to attack. The Seneca, it was pointed out by La Barre, were at the heart of the current problem, so they would be the target. The matter then became where and when. The “where” was the easier of the two questions. An attack would be launched from Fort Frontenac across Lake Ontario with the aim of destroying the primary Seneca villages along the south shore of the lake. The “when” was more difficult. First, it involved raising the necessary forces. It was estimated that a thousand men, mostly militia, would have to be employed in the field for several months. To support this effort, supplies would have to be accumulated at Fort Frontenac, and the garrison of this fort as well as the supporting forts along the upper St. Lawrence would have to be bolstered. Once this was accomplished a fleet of canoes carrying half of the army would depart Fort Frontenac followed by the rest of the army in three small vessels stationed at the fort. The two forces would land along the southern shore of Lake Ontario and then march on the Seneca.

  There were no objections to the plan other than that it would take over a year to put in place. First, funds were necessary to procure and transport the supplies. Second, three small barks would have to be built at Fort Frontenac to facilitate the movement of the army. Next, the militia would have to be called out, which placed the expedition in the late spring or early summer to avoid interfering with planting or the harvest. Lastly, to support the campaign and guard the approaches to Canada while the army was on the frontier, some three hundred to four hundred soldiers would have to be sent by the king, assuming he agreed to the expedition.16

  La Barre transmitted his plan and his requests to France for approval and implemented what measures he could to secure the frontier. Reinforcements were sent to the Ottawa and Potawatomi, while envoys were sent to the Iroquois to engage them in dialog with the intent of holding their attention while preparations for the expedition proceeded. La Barre’s fear of a major Iroquois offensive against the Ottawa and Potawatomi did not materialize over the course of 1683, and although the two tribes’ loyalty seemed to waiver, no doubt due to the idea of gaining access to the cheaper goods provided by the English at Albany, in the end they were not interested in letting the Iroquois act as middlemen for this trade, and hence they stayed firm to the French alliance.

  The French court was not initially swayed by La Barre’s call for military action, having been convinced by the recently returned Frontenac that a negotiated settlement was the course to pursue. Eventually, however, the king agreed that “as circumstances may arise in a country so distant as Canada which would oblige it to be proclaimed, he empowers the said Sieur de la Barre to begin it, provided he certainly finds himself in a condition to terminate it advantageously in a year’s time.” Although the response was short on his request for troops and munitions, at least La Barre was granted the money he needed to proceed.17

  Making no inroads to the north in the spring of 1684 the Iroquois made one last attempt westward. A war party of some two hundred marched into the Illinois country and at once stumbled upon fourteen Frenchmen on their way to trade with the Illinois. The French party was quickly captured and their goods, valued at some fifteen thousand livres, plundered. Buoyed by this success, the war party advanced to the Illinois River and launched an attack on Fort St. Louis. Henri-Louis Baugy, who La Barre had recently appointed to take command of Fort St. Louis, had been warned of the war party’s intentions and prepared a rude reception for them. The Iroquois, hoping to surprise the garrison, immediately launched a frontal attack, which was easily repelled. After skulking about the fort for six days, occasionally sniping at its occupants, the Iroquois war party withdrew, with small detachments of Illinois and Miami warriors in pursuit. It was another failed attempt on the part of the Iroquois to break the French-Illinois-Miami coalition, and this time there were to be consequences.

  The attack, coupled with concerned letters from the posts in the Illinois and lake country, set La Barre in motion. He would proceed with his expedition even without the troops he had requested from France. Orders were sent to Sieur du Lhut and Olivier de La Durantaye in the “high country” to gather together as many coureurs de bois and allied warriors as possible and rendezvous with the army on Lake Ontario. While the militia was being called out, La Barre wrote Governor Thomas Dongan of New York, who had replaced Andros, notifying him of French intentions. La Barre informed Dongan that he had been ordered by the French court to maintain cordial relations with the English and understood that James, the Duke of York, had issued a similar directive. He then pointed out to the New York governor that his grievances and efforts were only directed at the Seneca and the Cayuga, who he held responsible for the attack on Fort St. Louis. He requested that, in keeping with both sovereigns’ wishes, Dongan forbid all arms and ammunition sales to the Seneca as well as punish those who would transfer them such merchandise. Lastly, La Barre politely informed Dongan that, “If you have any cause of complaint against their conduct, you can advance it now, and I shall consider your interests as those of the King my master.”18

  The French governor was caught off guard by the reply. Dongan informed La Barre that there must be some confusion given that the Iroquois were English subjects, but not to worry,

  I intend forthwith to go myself to Albany on purpose, and there send for the Indyans and require of them to do what is just in order to a satisfaction to your pretences, if they will not, I shall not unjustly protect them, but do for your Governmt all that can be reasonably expected from and in the mean time for to preserve and continue a good amity between us I think it convenient, and desire of you that no act of hostility be committed; such differences are of so weighty a concern that they are most proper to be decided at home and not by us.19

  From here matters only degenerated between the two leaders. La Barre had no intention of allowing Dongan to interfere with his expedition, nor did he accept the idea that the Iroquois were English subjects, while Dongan made the case that the French governor was about to launch an attack into English territory, which was in direct violation of their kings’ mutual mandates. After a few rounds of accusations and recriminations the correspondence came to a halt.

  Although nothing but a war of words, the correspondence did offer Dongan an opportunity. As he promised La Barre, the Iroquois sachems were summoned to Albany, although not to discuss problems with the French but to provide an explanation as to why they had raided the Maryland frontier. Nonetheless, Dongan used the occasion to warn the Iroquois and press the idea that the Iroquois were English subjects. To his delight the Iroquois, fearing an open rupture with the French and their allies, were willing to declare themselves English subjects and put all their land under the protection of King Charles II. In return the governor urged the Iroquois to hold fast against La Barre’s efforts and pledged to do what he could for them, even going so far as to give them copies of the Duke of York’s coat of arms to be placed at the head of their villages. In securing this much from the conference Dongan had pressed the limit of New York’s claims in an attempt to check French westward expansion, but in reality there was little he could do in terms of direct involvement. Letters from the Duke of York’s secretary, Sir John Werden, made clear the extent of Dongan’s powers. “Encourage the Indians all you can,” he informed the governor, “but not so as to vex your European neighbours. It will be impossible to get the French to give up trading with them, so we must try by our good dealing to make them prefer to trade with us rather than with the French.” A few months later Werden was even clearer in terms of the governor’s relations with New France. “Use your prudence,” he wrote Dongan, “without shocking the Governor of Canada, to discourage the trade of the French with the Indians by attracting the Indians to trade with us.”20

  For La Barre the maddening correspondence with Dongan was nothing more than an unpleasa
nt distraction. More important tasks now filled his mind. Although his numbers were closer to eight hundred than the projected one thousand, the effort to assemble this force at Fort Frontenac was of a scale not seen since Tracy’s expedition in 1666. Strings of canoes loaded with supplies traced the upper St. Lawrence as far as La Galette. At this location the supply canoes transferred their cargo to the newly constructed bark, the Le Generale. The canoes then returned to Montreal to collect another load while the bark pressed on to Fort Frontenac. Moving the troops proved even more trying. There was a shortage of canoes and a need to build larger flat-bottom vessels to carry the army’s field gear, and many of the troops were inexperienced when it came to navigating the perils of the river. Native guides helped alleviate this last problem, but the logistics coupled with a southwest wind delayed the governor’s advance to Fort Frontenac by several weeks.

  By early August 1684 the bulk of the French army had reached Fort Frontenac. With his forces now gathered about the stone citadel La Barre was buoyed by the arrival of Charles Le Moyne along with several hundred allied warriors, but because the contrary winds had interfered with the passage of the Le Generale a shortage of flour stalled any plans to advance across the lake. Although of concern, the delays were not the foremost thoughts in the governor’s mind. A letter had reached him a few weeks earlier from Father Lamberville that the Onondaga were in favor of peace and that they had convinced the other tribes to allow them to negotiate a treaty between the French and the Five Nations. If this was not pursued, Lamberville warned the governor, the Iroquois would consider an attack on the Seneca an act of war against the confederacy. After all the prior considerations on the matter La Barre should have dismissed the news, but there were good reasons to consider this new course of action. First, his army was ill-supplied, ill-trained, and uncertain of the size of the threat before them. Second, since no reinforcements had arrived from France, these troops represented the bulk of Canada’s defenses. Should something go awry, be it the loss of the army or a widening of the conflict as Lamberville had warned, the colony would be vulnerable to a counteroffensive. Lastly, it had been eighteen years since the French had openly warred with the Iroquois, and at that time they did not have far-flung posts scattered about the Great Lakes to defend. The logistics and communications issues involved in accomplishing this task might be beyond the capabilities of the colony.21

  Against the advice of many and the backdrop of rumors that the governor had given up on a military solution, La Barre dispatched Le Moyne to entreat with the Onondaga. While he waited at Fort Frontenac for word of Le Moyne’s mission, supply shortages and illness struck the French army. An idle amateur army is never a good thing. Food shortages and persistent rumors only made things worse. The wet campground about the fort was hardly ideal, and soon an epidemic of influenza had taken hold. Some relief came on August 21 when a number of canoes arrived, having transferred the contents of the bark to their holds. La Barre wasted no time in ordering bread and biscuits made, and the next day, hoping to prevent a complete loss of his forces to the epidemic, he dispatched two-thirds of his army to La Famine, a small bay on the south shore of Lake Ontario a short march from the main Seneca villages.

  Four days later, one of Le Moyne’s sons arrived with news that, although Dongan had forbade the Onondaga from negotiating with the French, they agreed to meet with La Barre at La Famine to conclude their talks. It was the news the governor had been waiting for. After seeing to some final details and assigning a garrison to the fort, La Barre and the remaining elements of the army set sail for La Famine a few days later.

  For the French army matters were little better at La Famine. Supply shortages abounded and if anything the campgrounds at La Famine were worse than those at Fort Frontenac. This did little to prevent the spread of illness among the ranks. Over 150 men had been struck down by fever, which when added to those left at Fort Frontenac had reduced the army by nearly a third. At the rate things were proceeding there would be no French army if the Iroquois did not arrive soon.22

  Mercifully, the Onondaga, Oneida, and Cayuga representatives arrived on September 3. The next day a grand ceremony was held to commence the talks. French drums rolled and presents were exchanged to long orations speaking to the goal of peace between the two parties. With the preliminaries concluded Hateouati, who spoke for the Iroquois, asked a gravely ill La Barre why he sought to break the peace between the French and the Five Nations. The pillaging of the French convoy in the Illinois country had not resulted in any deaths and certainly was not reason enough to go to war.

  Reparations would be made, Hateouati assured him, which should solve the matter. La Barre accepted the gesture and asked that the Iroquois also return a number of native prisoners they held.

  Hateouati, well aware of the state of the French army and the dire circumstances the governor had placed himself in, avoided the request and pressed his advantage. “Why the army?” he asked. Certainly no good would come of this. “I pray,” he told La Barre, “you return to Quebec, so that your children may sleep in peace.” And from now on, he continued, they should meet at La Famine; Fort Frontenac had too many grasshoppers, which interrupted the Iroquois sleep, and Montreal was too far for them to travel.

  To Hateouati’s delight La Barre agreed to both requests. He would leave the next day, and from now on they would meet at La Famine. With the advantage quickly swinging in his favor the Iroquois spokesman made clear the confederacy’s position. They would cease warring with the Ottawa and Miami, but “regarding the Illinois, I am at war with him; we shall both of us die fighting.”23

  La Barre accepted this statement, although doing so undermined one of the principle reasons behind the expedition. As with the other Iroquois demands, he really had little choice. His army was in ruins. If the Iroquois chose to attack, most, if not all, of it would fall before their onslaught, which in turn would leave the colony open to attack. The number of sick was multiplying at such a rate that when the French embarked the next day it proved difficult to find enough healthy men to load the sick into the canoes. Nor were there any supplies left even if he had wanted to stay. Provisions were so scarce that there was “no more than the trifle of bread I had brought them.”

  The wreckage of La Barre’s army returned to Fort Frontenac while orders were dispatched to Durantaye, who had assembled some 150 French and 550 Ottawa at Niagara, to dismiss his forces. The news infuriated Durantaye, who had gone to great lengths to convince the Ottawa and several other tribes to join the effort. The Illinois, hearing word that the French and their allies had decided to attack the Seneca, had promised over one thousand warriors who had yet to arrive. Now, by ringing the bell but not seeing the venture through, the French appeared as questionable allies.

  La Barre, whose health had deteriorated even further, did not wait for his army and departed for Montreal with news of the treaty. There was widespread condemnation of the governor’s treaty throughout the colony. Many who had questioned his intentions from the outset now seemed convinced that they had been right all along. The intendant, Meulles, had previously warned the minister of the marine that “I can find no disposition whatsoever in the mind of M. le General to wage war with the Iroquois; I believe that he will content himself with going by canoe to Cataracoui [Frontenac]. . . and then have the Seneca come in order to treat for peace with them and so trick the people, the intendant, and if one dare say it, His Majesty.” Now, as the details of the treaty reached him, Meulles penned another letter to the minister informing him that there was almost universal disbelief throughout the colony. As opposed to chastising the Seneca, “he grants them all they ask.”24

  In Paris there was a similar reaction. La Barre’s concessions were not acceptable, nor, after some consideration, was La Barre.

  CHAPTER FIVE

  Rivals to the North

  IT TOOK THE FRENCH COURT over a year to recall La Barre. The order, when it came, spoke to the governor’s ill health as the reason for his
dismissal, but no one was confused as to the actual reasons. The man chosen to replace La Barre was Jacques-Rene Brisay, the Marquis de Denonville. Denonville was from an old French family of lower nobility, although his father, Pierre, had done much to change his families fortunes, rising to the position of one of the king’s councilors before eventually being appointed a major general in 1668. As his eldest son, Jacques-Rene inherited the title marquis and entered the army at an early age. By twenty-six he had obtained a captaincy in the Regiment Royal and three years later was made a captain in the Queen’s Dragoons. Denonville served throughout the Dutch War of 1672, quickly rising in rank until he eventually purchased the regiment in 1675, obtaining the rank of colonel in the process. News of his talents reached the highest levels, and upon the conclusion of the conflict he was appointed inspector general of dragoons. A few years later, in 1683, he was promoted to brigadier general. A devout and pious man by nature, Denonville was known for his bravery and, more importantly, his organizational skills and attention to detail. Considered one of the best military officers in France, this alone would have seemed sufficient qualifications for the post of governor general of Canada, particularly given the martial efforts that would be required to reverse the damage done by La Barre, but Denonville possessed another trait that may have been more telling in his selection; he was honest almost to a fault. Given the confusion that surrounded the affairs of New France and the myriad opinions and partial truths that reached Versailles, perhaps this last element was the deciding factor in his appointment.1

  Denonville’s orders, issued to him on March 10, 1685, made clear the king’s intentions “to secure the quiet of Canada by a firm and solid peace; but in order that such a peace be permanent, the pride of the Iroquois must be humbled, the Illinois and other allies who have been abandoned by Sieur de La Barre must be sustained, and the Iroquois must from the outset be given, by a firm and vigorous policy, to understand that they will have everything to dread if they do not submit to the conditions it will be his pleasure to impose on them.” The king had left it to the marquis’s discretion on how best to proceed. A peaceful settlement was preferred, which of course promoted trade and profited all, but if this was not possible then Denonville was free to use whatever resources were at his disposal to bring the Iroquois around by force of arms. As for the English, and in particular the governor of New York who seemed to be supporting the Iroquois efforts, Denonville was directed to maintain cordial relations with his colonial counterparts, “but if the latter, contrary to all appearances, excite and aid the Indians, they must be treated as enemies when found on Indian territory, without, at the same time, attempting anything on territory under the obedience of the King of England.” He was also to be aware of English pretensions in Acadia (Nova Scotia). Reports were that the government of Massachusetts had seized several long-standing French posts in this area and had yet to explain their actions.2