King William's War Page 11
Satisfied that little more could be done, Denonville gave the order for the army to return to its boats. By July 30, the force had embarked and arrived at Niagara where Denonville put his men to work erecting a stockade fort. With the fort finished and a garrison in place under the command of Troyes, the governor released the militia on August 2. The next day he departed Fort Niagara and, after making a few defensive preparations at Fort Frontenac, by late August he was back in Montreal.
The expedition was a partial success. The Seneca were not destroyed, as they had successfully avoided a major engagement, but at the very least they had been humbled. This was enough to bring the allied tribes back into the French fold, but there were other complications. During the campaign two English trading parties were captured on the lakes. There was little choice but to do so. Both were sponsored by New York and both were intent on establishing a trading post at Michilimackinac near the outlet of Lake Superior. Given the rebellious state of the French tribes in the area, and the proliferation of cheap English goods that would have followed, not seizing the traders would have ended in an open break between the French and their native allies.8
Attacking the Seneca was bad enough, but the seizure of Englishmen incensed Dongan. The governor, who was meeting with the representatives of the Five Nations at the time the news arrived, informed them that as English subjects they must obey his commands and make no treaty with the French without his consent. He urged them to make peace with the lake tribes and expel the French from the west. The Iroquois, still smarting from the attack, agreed. “We will fight the French,” they informed the governor, “as long as we have a man left.” Dongan then turned his anger toward Denonville. He demanded the release of the English traders and their goods. Denonville refused, claiming that, by providing arms to the Seneca, Dongan had violated the recent treaty. The pair exchanged a series of counterarguments, which culminated in a number of threatening letters, but neither was prepared to budge.9
Denonville’s actions were in accordance with his instructions and seemed to be within the scope of his directives. Dongan’s conduct, however, is much harder to justify. The governor claimed the Iroquois as English subjects yet continually urged them to attack the French and provided them with the arms necessary to do so. Had these been the English citizens of Albany, there would have been open war, but since it was the Iroquois, the English governor could feign ignorance or simply say he would look into their conduct when the French complained. Dongan wanted to play both sides of the fence, and the French weren’t buying it. He had managed to draw the Iroquois within his jurisdiction but only to the point of a direct confrontation with New France.
For New France, the following year proved nearly catastrophic. After a massive undertaking, Denonville had ultimately failed to undermine the Seneca’s military strength and his seizure of the neutral Iroquois had raised the entire Five Nations against him. Roving bands of Iroquois kept most of the colony fort-bound, leading to a disastrous harvest, a collapse in the fur trade, and widespread economic ruin. In an attempt to secure some form of peace, the governor was forced to demolish Fort Niagara and return the English traders and Iroquois taken during his expedition. There was a moment of hope when Dongan was recalled, but this faded quickly when his replacement, Edmund Andros, the former governor, continued Dongan’s aggressive policies.
With little choice, Denonville sued for a more permanent peace with the Iroquois and met with them in Montreal. The Five Nations, who held the upper hand in the negotiations, were initially indifferent to the idea. Their spokesman harangued the French for their misguided actions and broken promises. He then openly threatened Denonville, saying that they knew the weakness of the French and that the Five Nations could exterminate them whenever they chose to do so. Even so, the Iroquois spokesman concluded, in the interest of peace the Iroquois were willing to bury the hatchet. A treaty of neutrality was signed until a more permanent agreement could be concluded some time later that year when the delegation returned to Montreal. But the delegation never returned, under the excuse that Governor Andros would not allow it.10
For Denonville, a lifelong soldier, there seemed only one answer to the whole problem: the destruction of the Iroquois. He wrote to the minister of the marine in France with a plan to attack both the Mohawk and Seneca simultaneously. This time, however, the French would occupy the Iroquois villages and use them as staging points to continue the attacks on these tribes throughout the year. Forts would be built to support these efforts, the last of which was projected to be at the end of Lake Champlain. The plan was bold and beyond the capabilities of the colony. Several thousand men would be involved, many of whom would have to stay in the field throughout the year. The plan was also certain to bring the colony into a direct military confrontation with New York. The king agreed that three or four thousand men could accomplish the task, but at the moment he was not interested in provoking the English. Thus the project was set aside.11
But Denonville was not finished with the idea. He sent the governor of Montreal, Callières, to France to explain the perilous position of the colony and to lay an even more ambitious plan before the king: the conquest of New York. The argument was simple. The English were the real enemy. It was they who incited the Iroquois to attack Canada and supplied them with the weapons and means to do so. It was they who had violated the neutrality treaty, and it was they who made territorial claims to the ruin of the commerce of New France. With New York in French hands, the Iroquois would have no choice but to join the French cause. This would lead to complete control of the American fur trade. New England would be isolated and New France would possess not only a fine year-round harbor but land more fertile as any in Canada as well.
The plan called for 600 militia and 1,400 colonial troops to march on Albany by way of the Lake Champlain and Lake George route. The expedition would build a stockade fort at the head of Lake George, where two hundred of their number would be left to guard the larger boats and barges. The remaining 1,800 soldiers would haul their canoes and supplies through a dozen miles of swamp-laced forest to the reaches of the upper Hudson. From there they would proceed directly for Albany, leaving a small detachment to secure the hamlet of Saratoga along the way. The defenses of Albany were estimated to be some 300 militia and 150 regulars, who garrisoned the old fort on the western edge of the town. A fourteen-foot wooden palisade surrounded the village, but this would not prove much of an obstacle to 1,800 determined men. Albany would be summoned to surrender, and in the unlikely event that it refused, it would be stormed. In either case it would quickly be in French hands. Two hundred men would be left to garrison the town, while the rest of the expedition procured whatever water transportation it could find and, with the cannon seized from Fort Albany, proceed downriver to Manhattan. The town of New York had some four hundred militia under arms and one hundred or so regulars manning Fort James. If history was any indicator, most of the militia would refuse to fight, and the defenses of Fort James were known to be poor. Upon arriving at Manhattan, the expedition would coordinate with two French men-of-war, which would enter the harbor and cannonade the English fort while the troops on the landside stormed the town.12
The scheme was audacious and, to make it more appealing to the king, cheap. Denonville and Callières only asked for the use of two men-of-war and the replacements needed to bring the colonial troops up to full strength. The rest of the manpower would come from Canada. The bateaux and canoes needed for the expedition along with the other necessary supplies were already on hand from the previous campaigns.
This time Louis took notice. He was pleased with the cost of the venture and the benefits it would bring, but its timing was the root cause of his interest. In England the Glorious Revolution had deposed King James and placed the Dutchman William of Orange on the throne of England. Louis realized that it would only be a matter of time before William drew England into the league of nations arrayed against him. In Europe war between England and France wa
s likely but not yet certain. Louis ordered the logistics for the expedition to be pushed forward but wrote Denonville that until an open rupture existed between the two countries nothing else could be done.13
CHAPTER SEVEN
Acadia and New England
FRENCH ACADIA, or Nova Scotia as it would later be called, was no less immune to the growing Anglo-French tensions than Hudson Bay or the western frontier. In fact, tensions had run high along this isthmus since its settlement by the French in 1604. After abandoning the initial colony in 1607, a second effort was made at Port Royal in 1610 under the leadership of Jean de Biencourt de Poutrincourt. Poutrincourt’s fledgling colony eked out an existence and lived without incident next to its Micmac neighbors for the next few years. In 1613 their peaceful existence was shattered when Captain Samuel Argall, Pocahontas’s famous captor, launched an assault on Port Royal. Argall was under orders from England to prevent the French from establishing a colony in Acadia. Over the course of two voyages he leveled the Jesuit mission of St. Sauveur in modern-day Maine, demolished the old French colonial position at St. Croix, and burned Port Royal to the ground, scattering its inhabitants. Argall’s campaigns very nearly ended the French settlement in Acadia. Port Royal was partially rebuilt, but Poutrincourt soon departed while Charles La Tour and a number of other enterprising individuals abandoned Port Royal not long after to pursue their fortunes in the fur trade. La Tour built a small fort at Cape Sable named St. Louis, and from here he and others carried forth their business.1
In 1621 Sir William Alexander, the future Earl of Sterling, was granted a Royal Charter over Nova Scotia, an area roughly comprising modern-day Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the northwest section of Maine. Alexander had yet to exploit his royal grant, but with the fall of Quebec in the spring of 1629 he saw his opportunity. He easily obtained permission from King James I to sponsor colonies in Acadia, partly with the intention of securing the crown’s new possessions by occupation, which always carried great weight in such matters. By midsummer two Scottish colonies were formed, one at Port Royal and a second at Baliene on Cape Breton Island. La Tour, seeing that Cape Sable was the only major holding still in French hands, appealed to France for help.
Aid was forthcoming as was an appointment for La Tour who, after building a fort at the mouth of the St. John River named Fort St. Marie, helped successfully guide the French colony through the Anglo-French War. With the signing of the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-Laye in 1632, Acadia was once again French. Governor Isaac de Razilly, acting on behalf of the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France, officially took possession from the Scots in the fall of 1632 and established his post at Port Royal. La Tour and Razilly had demarcated zones of responsibilities as directed by the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France. Razilly was to administer to Port Royal and the St. Croix area, while La Tour was concerned with the region about his headquarters at Fort St. Marie. The arrangement seemed to work, trade flourished, and the colony grew. In 1635, however, Razilly died and left his holdings in the company to his brother Charles. Charles was not interested in leaving France to see to his brother’s business interests in Acadia, so he recruited his cousin Charles D’Aulnay to see to the task.2
It was not long before La Tour and D’Aulnay began to clash. The matter became an open quarrel over D’Aulnay’s handling of business transactions that had long been settled between Razilly and La Tour. Soon, D’Aulnay was petitioning the company to have La Tour removed. Using his influence at court, D’Aulnay obtained a set of very general orders from the king concerning La Tour’s return to France as an excuse to attack and capture Fort St. Marie. The event would set off a violent feud between the two men that would last almost a decade. La Tour obtained support from the vice admiral of France, but when his relief vessels arrived at St. John he found that D’Aulnay had erected a blockade of the post. Undaunted, La Tour sailed to Boston and hired four ships along with a number of soldiers to force a passage into St. John. When D’Aulnay received reports of La Tour’s fleet in the Bay of Fundy he retreated to Port Royal. La Tour followed, and when D’Aulnay refused to negotiate, La Tour backed by his own men and some 350 English mercenaries attacked and quickly defeated D’Aulnay’s forces. The governor was quick to complain to the king, insinuating that La Tour was a traitor, in league with the English, and had incited open rebellion. La Tour’s reputation was severely damaged. D’Aulnay took advantage of La Tour’s absence in early 1645 and once again besieged Fort St. Marie. Although he was driven off, the governor returned a few months later and was successful in capturing the post.
D’Aulnay’s death in a boating accident in 1650 brought La Tour back to France. For the last several years he had worked with the governor of New France in Quebec and with the Jesuit missionaries there. The support of these two important branches of the colony proved crucial as he made his case before the king, calling for an inquest to clear his name. In the end the king exonerated him and restored his position in Acadia. It was not the end of La Tour’s experiences in Nova Scotia, but it was the end of the civil war that raged between the two leaders, which, beyond the blood and treasure lost on both sides, proved divisive enough that it stunted the growth of the colony.3
A few years later on July 14, 1654, La Tour found himself once again immersed in conflict. Gazing out upon the St. John roadstead he saw a number of warships flying English colors. The English force, under the command of Captain John Leverett and Major Robert Sedgewick, had originally sailed to Boston as part of a plan to attack New Amsterdam, but the expedition was called off at the last moment when news arrived that the First Anglo-Dutch War had come to an end. This did not, however, end Sedgewick’s mission in America. Leverett had aligned his interests with those of New England, which saw a commercial and military threat posed by French Acadia. Using an element of his orders, which called upon him to make reprisals against French commerce in response to attacks on English vessels by French privateers, he sailed for Acadia. After mounting a brief defense, there was little La Tour could do but comply with Sedgewick’s demand to surrender. La Tour’s fort mounted a few cannon but was not a match for one of the English warships, much less their combined might. After putting up a show of resistance, Port Royal followed suit. Penobscot followed shortly thereafter, and for the next thirteen years Acadia was occupied by the English. It is interesting to note that the decision to seize Acadia came at a time of peace between France and England and was not officially ordered by the lord protector, but Cromwell hardly objected to the new acquisitions, viewing them as bargaining pieces in future negotiations.4
Acadia was returned to France in 1667 with the Treaty of Breda that brought an end to the Second Anglo-Dutch War. Although the colony was returned, its actual boundaries were not specified, which would soon lead to more problems on the peninsula. In fact, it was argued soon after the agreement was signed that, while LaHave and Cape Sable were in Acadia, Port Royal and St. John were in the Scottish settlement of Nova Scotia and as such were not covered by the treaty.5
With the return of the colony there were administrative changes as well, brought on primarily by Talon and placed into effect with the arrival of the Marquis de Tracy.
The elements of New France were to be administered by royal rule. No longer would the Compagnie de la Nouvelle-France reign over the actions of the colony. Acadia would get its own royal governor who would be subordinate to the governor of New France in Quebec. The colony’s first governor, the Chevalier Andigne de Grand-Fontaine, established himself not at Port Royal but at Penobscot. The fort at Port Royal was too decayed, and the latter location was better suited toward maintaining communications with Quebec. In 1670 Grand-Fontaine officially took control from English governor Sir Thomas Temple, who reported to the government of Massachusetts that he had surrendered “Pentagoet (Penobscot), St. John, Port Royal containing the whole country under my command” and that, according to the agreement. the border between the French and English colonies was to be the Penobscot River.
 
; A few years later, in 1674, the Dutch under Captain Jurriaen Aernoutsz attacked and captured Acadia, but the resulting occupation and claims to the peninsula would not last two years. During this period King Philip’s War raged throughout the New England colonies. Philip, a Wampanoag chieftain, had launched a native alliance against New England that sorely pressed the northern colonies, turning the towns and hamlets of Massachusetts and Connecticut into battlegrounds. The distraction presented by the conflict likely prevented Acadia from becoming the victim of another New England invasion, but it did not stop the colonists of Massachusetts from claiming that the French “had a hand in the late warre with the Indians.”6
There was some truth to this accusation. When skirmishing broke out along the Maine frontier between settlers and the pro-French Wabanaki Confederacy that occupied the area, rumors circulated that a French officer led the natives. The individual in question was the Baron Jean-Vincent de St. Castin, an ensign stationed at Penobscot before the Dutch invasion of Acadia. The young baron met with Frontenac in 1674, at which point the governor directed him to convince the Abenaki and the other tribes throughout Acadia to take up the French cause. Castin took well to the task, eventually becoming an adopted Abenaki and marrying the daughter of a Penobscot chieftain. Although the Wabanaki Confederacy was sympathetic to Philip’s cause, they had their own concerns about New England expansion into their territories, which meshed nicely with St. Castin’s cause. Encouraged by Castin, in 1675 they attacked the Maine frontier, burning English settlements between Casco and the Saco River and raiding others as far south as Wells. The following year was a repeat of the first, eventually reaching the point that the Maine frontier settlements, which at the time were under the jurisdiction of New York, were abandoned, including Fort Pemaquid.7